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Introduction
This article describes why and how U.S. media firms should co-pro-
duce and distribute programming in the European Community (E.C.). 1
In particular, it focuses on the burgeoning demand for programming in
the E.C., juxtaposed against government policies and court decisions af-
fecting media joint ventures. Recent regulations that will be discussed
in-depth include, among other things, the Council Directive on the Coor-
dination of Certain Provisions Laid Down by Law, Regulation or Ad-
ministrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of
Television Broadcasting Activities2 (Directive), passed by the European
Council on October 3, 1989, and Evaluation of the Syndication and Fi-
nancial Interest Rules3 (FISR) in which the U.S. Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) relaxed the rules to give networks greater
freedom to hold financial interests and syndication rights in program-
ming, domestically and abroad.
Part I describes the evolution of programming demand in the E.C.
and explains why it is important for U.S. media firms to forge relation-
ships with E.C. firms despite the E.C.'s limitations on co-productions. It
takes the position that U.S. firms should not wait for the resolution of the
U.S. government's attack on these limitations as protectionist. Part II
outlines the parameters of the Directive and describes how E.C.-U.S.
joint ventures may be structured to comply with E.C. Member State leg-
islation passed pursuant to the Directive, without compromising their
primary business objectives. Part II also addresses the effect of the new
FISR on structuring network co-productions. Finally, Part III briefly
describes the scope of copyright protection available in the E.C. and out-
lines the limitations that the European Court of Justice has placed upon
the copyright protection of works widely distributed in the E.C.
1. The E.C. is currently comprised of the following twelve Member States: France, the
United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, It-
aly, Spain, Portugal and Greece.
2. 1989 O.J. Eur. Comm. (L 298) 23 [hereinafter Directive].
3. In re Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, Report and Order, 6
FCC Rcd. 3094 (1991) [hereinafter Report and Order]; In re Evaluation of the Syndication and
Financial Interest Rules, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 5 FCC Rcd. 1815 (1990) [hereinafter
NPRM]; In re Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 5 FCC Rcd. 6463 (1990) [hereinafter Further Notice]. The decision, as
outlined in the Report and Order, was adopted by Commissioners Barrett, Marshall, and Dug-
gan. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j) (1990). Commissioner Quello and Chairman Sikes dissented in
separate statements attached to the Report and Order.
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I
Why U.S Media Firms Should Co-Produce
Programming in the European Community
In deciding whether to enter a joint venture with an E.C. firm, to co-
produce programming in the E.C., a U.S. media firm must consider sev-
eral somewhat antithetical factors. The burgeoning market for program-
ming in Europe is extremely attractive to U.S. media firms. U.S. firms
are not barred at this time from pursuing media joint ventures in the E.C
and should not hesitate to take advantage of the vast opportunities avail-
able in the E.C. However, certain legal measure' and political pressures
by the U.S. and E.C. governments are potentially inhibitive. In order to
fully appreciate the importance of moving swiftly in entering co-produc-
tions in the E.C., it is helpful to consider how the E.C. audiovisual mar-
ket has evolved and where it is going.
Heretofore, the E.C. countries have not had significant export earn-
ings from sales of films and television programs.4 This has been due to
linguistic differences and the undeveloped and fragmented nature of Eu-
ropean programming production.5 By contrast, over fifty percent of the
earnings for U.S. firms from the distribution of major films has come
from foreign sales, primarily in Europe.6 Of the 250,000 hours of televi-
sion programming broadcast in the E.C. in 1987, 20,000 hours consisted
of U.S. imports.7 Thus, U.S. firms have established a respectable pres-
ence in Europe despite the fact that the European broadcasting industry
has been almost entirely publicly owned and government controls over
the movie industry have restricted foreign investment and joint
ventures.8
In the last few years, the E.C. has progressively deregulated and
privatized these industries. As a result, there has been a virtual explosion
of demand for audiovisual programming in the E.C. It is estimated by
one source that the number of broadcast stations in the E.C. has in-
4. Reply Comments of Robert B. Cohen, Economic Policy Institute, to Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking in MM Dkt No. 90-162, at 11 (July 27, 1990) [hereinafter Cohen
Comments].
5. Id. One source reports that more than 70% of the fiction programs shown in the E.C.
are made outside the E.C. Ertugrul, EC Agrees on Rules for "TV Without Frontiers,"
REUTERS, Mar. 13, 1989 (AM cycle).
6. Cohen Comments, supra note 4, at 5. In 1987, the U.S. sold $675 million worth of
television programming to Western Europe and in 1988 the amount increased to $844 million
of programming. Paul Presburger & Michael R. Tyler, Television Without Frontiers: Opportu-
nity and Debate Created by the New European Community Directive, 13 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 495, 501-02 (1990).
7. Cohen Comments, supra note 4, at 11.
8. Id. at 5.
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creased from the sixty-one stations in 1987 to eighty-six stations in 1992.'
Consequently, the number of hours of European programming needed
will increase from 250,000 hours in 1987 to 440,000 hours in 1992.10
Aside from sales of initial broadcast programming, foreign syndication
yields $4 billion per year." Other European programming markets are
likewise opening up. European earnings from film, television broadcast-
ing, and home video rentals combined could grow from $28 billion to $58
billion over the next ten years.' 2
This picture would look very bright, but for several current legal
and political limitations, the most important of which are the E.C. Direc-
tive and the U.S. response to it. The Directive limits the amount of non-
European programming that can be broadcast on European networks.'
3
The U.S. government has challenged the Directive as protectionist. In
this regard, the U.S. Trade Representative has brought a complaint
under the Most Favored Nation and National Treatment clauses of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).' 4 The E.C. asserts
that the measures are only aimed at protecting the European culture. 5
The Trade Representative responded that this argument cannot be recon-
ciled in light of the separate and distinct cultures within the European
Community itself. 6 The E.C. also asserts that the GATT regulates
goods, not services, and that broadcasting is a service. ' In addition, the
9. Jonathan Weber, Turning the Volume Down, L.A. TIMES, July 26, 1989, pt. 4, at 1.
The E.C. itself estimates, somewhat less conservatively, that by 1993, there will be 200 Euro-
pean television stations, double the number existing in 1990. Questions and Answers about the
European Community's "TV Without Frontiers" Directive, Delegation of the Comm'n of the
Eur. Comm., Press & Pub. Affairs, Nov. 1, 1989, at 2 [hereinafter Questions and Answers].
The number of new stations is due in part to the emergence of new satellite broadcasters. "By
January, 1991, there [were] 64 high or medium power transponders available for use by pay
television channels, compared to none until January 1989." Cohen Comments, supra note 4,
at 13.
10. Weber, supra note 9, at 1. Another source indicates a growth of programming hours
from 250,000 to 450,000 between 1988 and 1995. Cohen Comments, supra note 4, at 1. The
60 networks in Europe require 125,000 hours of product, of which only 25,000 hours originate
in Europe. Id. This growth amounts to over 10% annually. Id. at 5.
11. In re Evaluation of the Syndication Financial Interest Rules, Comments of Senator
William E. Brock, Chairman, The Brock Group in MM Dkt No. 90-162, at 3 (Dec. 7, 1990)
[hereinafter Brock Comments].
12. Cohen Comments, supra note 4, at 11. Only 25% of the homes in continental Europe
had video cassette receivers in 1990, compared to the 70% level in the U.S. Id. at 13.
13. Directive, supra note 2, at art. 4(1). Other proposals have from time to time further
attempted to restrict the number of titles, prints, and cassettes that may be imported into the
E.C. A discussion of these trade measures, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
14. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
pts. 5-6, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
15. Id.
16. Presburger & Tyler, supra note 6, at 505.
17. Id. at 507.
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E.C. argues that the restrictions are GATT-compatible because of the
GATT's treatment of cinemagraphic films.'" The U.S. contests both of
these positions."9
If the GATT Panel upholds the Directive, the U.S. has other op-
tions. The Trade Representative could act under "Super 301," which al-
lows the U.S. to take certain trade-related retaliatory actions.20 The U.S.
could also act pursuant to the Richardson Proposal, which requires the
FCC to obtain the President's views regarding whether foreign compa-
nies discriminate against U.S. television or films before granting a request
filed by an affiliate of a foreign person for forbearance of FCC
regulation.2'
It is entirely appropriate for the U.S. government to attack E.C.
measures, such as the Directive, as protectionist by bringing a complaint
before a GATT Panel. The validity of the Directive could have a major
impact on the growing U.S. trade deficit. As of July 1989, the U.S. film
and television industry had a $2.5 billion trade surplus, with one half of
worldwide revenues coming from European sales.22 Some commentators
have argued that U.S.-E.C. co-production joint ventures undermine the
U.S. position on the Directive.2a However, there are several reasons why
U.S. firms should not wait for the political dust to settle before entering
joint ventures with E.C. firms.
First, it is evident that with or without U.S. firms, the E.C. will
develop an entertainment industry that will be very competitive interna-
tionally. The most telling example of the E.C.'s commitment to this ob-
jective can be seen in the series of initiatives recently proposed by the
European Commission, which acts on behalf of the twelve Member
States of the E.C. If successful, these initiatives would place the E.C.
among the major sources of world programming. One of these initiatives
is its MEDIA Programme, which was launched in 1986 and designed to
18. Under Article 3 of the Directive, the GATT's provisions must not operate so as to
prevent a Member State from maintaining internal quantitative regulations concerning ex-
posed cinematographic films or from meeting the requirements of Article 4, which allows
screen quotas for works of national origin.
19. Presburger & Tyler, supra note 6, at 505.
20. Id. at 507-08.
21. Id. at 508.
22. See id. at 501-02.
23. It has been argued that co-productions will only sustain the E.C. quotas while increas-
ing the efficiency of foreign competitors. Comments of Leonard Hill, to the Federal Communi-
cations Commission En Banc Hearing of the Financial Interest and Syndication Rules in MM
Dkt No. 90-162, at 11 (Dec. 14, 1990). However, others have responded that the U.S. will
benefit from co-productions. It is asserted that the flow of creative talent would be insured;
competition in the U.S. would be enhanced by permitting co-producers to attract foreign fi-
nancing for U.S. productions; and U.S. media firms would have incentives to create truly inter-
national products. Cohen Comments, supra note 4, at 7-8.
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complement the Directive.24 In the first stage, the E.C. defined a series of
pilot projects to develop the E.C.'s audiovisual capabilities in film and
television production, distribution and financing, script development,
computer graphics and imaging, multilingual product development, and
new methods of financing.2" The second stage, which began after 1989,
implemented a series of these programs. 26 In 1990, the E.C. Commis-
sioner for Audiovisual Affairs proposed an increase in funding for the
MEDIA Programme from its annual $5 million budget to $300 million."
These and other programs appear to be very well-organized and orches-
trated. Thus, as Europeans gain a greater share of their own market,
U.S. producers will lose ground unless they pursue joint ventures.
Second, the GATT Panel may find that such quotas are appropriate.
Some Member States, such as France, have already initiated stricter quo-
tas than those contained in the E.C. Directive. 28 Further, the Directive,
and Member State legislation passed pursuant to it, will most likely pre-
clude U.S. firms from merely investing in European firms because of the
Directive's proscription of non-European control. 29 The Directive also
appears to preclude or at least inhibit U.S. firms from opening up subsidi-
aries in the E.C. because of its requirement that a firm be "established"
there.3 0 Thus, should U.S. firms endeavor to enter joint ventures before
stricter quotas are imposed and while U.S. media firms still have some-
thing to offer E.C. joint venture partners.
Third, there is already less demand for U.S. programming in the
E.C., a trend that is likely to continue.3 1 For example, while U.S. theat-
rical films, made-for-television movies, and mini-series are attractive to
European broadcasters from a cost perspective, these programs are usu-
ally shown as "fillers," outside of prime time, often in the morning hours
or just prior to prime time. 2 Further, although U.S. programs dominate
prime time on the new privately-owned, direct broadcast satellite chan-
nels, 33 sales of American programs to Europe may have declined in cash
24. Communication from the Commission to the Council and Parliament on Audiovisual
Policy, COM(90)78 final, Brussels, (Feb. 21, 1990) at 5 [hereinafter Audiovisual Policy Com-
munication]. The acronym MEDIA stands for Measures to Encourage the Development of
the Audiovisual Industry.
25. Id. at 23-27.
26. Id. at 28-33.
27. Cohen Comments, supra note 4, at 35.
28. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
29. Directive, supra note 2, at arts. 4, 5, 6.
30. Id. at art. 6.2.
31. Joint Comments of Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., CBS, Inc. and NBC, Inc., Volume II:
Argument in MM Dkt No. 90-162, at 128 (June 14, 1990).
32. Id. at 21.
33. Id.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 14:1
terms. 34 European producers will also benefit from the fact that Euro-
pean viewers are becoming less interested in viewing U.S. programs,
which include repeated formats and ideas.3 5 This is likely to lead to
more demand for local production in European languages. Thus, even if
there were no restrictions on the broadcast of non-European works, or
other quotas on the number of titles, prints, or cassettes imported, it is
likely that U.S. producers would still fail to garner a significant share of
the European market solely through the sale of their own domestically-
produced programs.
Finally, co-production joint ventures between E.C. and U.S. firms
are potentially very symbiotic, despite the attention that has been given
to restrictions on imports. U.S. firms are primarily interested in the fi-
nancial gains to be had in the market. E.C. firms are particularly inter-
ested in learning the technical tools of the trade from U.S. firms, an area
in which U.S. producers have more to offer the E.C. than the producers
of any other country. To take advantage of this symbiosis, U.S. firms
should relinquish a degree of creative control but retain financial control
in U.S.-E.C. co-production joint ventures. By entering longer term joint
ventures, the U.S. partners can establish relationships with E.C. firms to
ensure future viability of the U.S. partner in the E.C. market. If the E.C.
continues to argue that their restrictions are merely for cultural pur-
poses, they should not object to joint ventures that are structured in this
way.
II
Structuring U.S.-E.C. Media Joint Ventures
The Directive stands as a limitation on, not a bar to, successful U.S.-
E.C. joint ventures.36 In structuring these ventures, it is important to
analyze the limitations, structure the venture to minimize the effect of the
limitations, and maximize each party's chances of realizing its objectives.
A. The E.C. Directive and Member State Legislation
Article 4.1 of the Directive requires Member States to "ensure
where practicable and by appropriate means, that broadcasters reserve
34. In re Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, Joint Comments of
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., CBS, Inc. & NBC., Inc. in MM Docket 90-162, at 128 (July 14,
1990).
35. Cohen Comments, supra note 4, at 13.
36. Moreover, there is evidence that the impact of the E.C. Directive will be minimal in
the near future. For example, the Community calculated that in 1989, U.S. sales comprised
only 28% of the Community market. The Community holds the view that the U.S. could
double or triple its sales to the E.C. because the Directive will allow an ever expanding market.
Questions and Answers, supra note 9, at 2.
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for European works, . . a majority proportion of their transmission
time, excluding the time appointed to news, sports events, games, adver-
tising and teletext services." 37 The Directive establishes only minimum
requirements, leaving Member States free to impose stricter require-
ments.38 Thus, under France's regulations, adopted January 17, 1990,
sixty percent of all programming broadcast in France as of January 1990
must be of "European origin."39 Moreover, the French government has
introduced legislation requiring that fifty percent of all programming
broadcast in France be originally produced in the French language.'
The United Kingdom has for several years enforced the requirement that
eighty-six percent of works transmitted on independent television be E.C.
works.4 However, under recent legislation in the United Kingdom,
British regional broadcasters would be required to transmit only a
"proper proportion" of works of "European origin."42
Pursuant to Article 6.1 of the Directive, "European works" are
those originating from Member States of the Community and European
Third States, party to the European Convention on Transfrontier Televi-
sion of the Council of Europe.43 For a 'cross-frontier' product to qualify
as a "European work," it must meet two requirements, the terms of
which are vague. The vagueness of the definition may result in divergent
requirements as each Member State develops its own interpretation.
First, the work must be "mainly made with authors and workers
residing in one or more [Member] States."" A production could involve
workers and authors who are residents of any combination of Member
States. It is unclear, however, whether the rule requires that the actual
number of resident authors and workers participating in the production
be greater than the number of nonresident authors and workers, or
37. Directive, supra note 2 at art. 4.1. This proportion should be achieved progressively.
Id. art. 4.2. However, if such a level cannot be attained, it must not be lower than the average
for 1988 in the Member State concerned. Id.
38. 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23, 24.
39. Decree No. 90-66 of Jan. 17, 1990, Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise [J.O.]
Jan 18, 1990, at 757 (Fr.).
40. Id. The author believes that while Denmark and Germany are opposed to a strict
"European work" requirement, both countries will initiate language restrictions similar to
those of France. The author also believes that Italy favors a strict quota system.
41. Broadcasting Act 1984 (Eng.).
42. Broadcasting Act 1990 (Eng.). The author believes that the U.K. will define the term
"European origin," similarly to the Directive's definition of "European work." Other coun-
tries may impose a language requirement.
43. Directive, supra note 2, at art. 6.1. Works originating from European Third States not
a party to the convention must fulfill separate conditions under Article 6.3. For purposes of
this article, reference will hereinafter be made only to productions in the territories of the
Member States, which will include works produced in the Federal Republic of Germany.
44. Id. at art. 6.2.
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whether a smaller number of resident authors and workers with key roles
in the production would meet the rule. If the former interpretation is
correct, key authors and workers producing the work could be non-resi-
dents. The work would still be mainly made with resident authors and
workers, assuming a greater number of residents were working on the
production. The latter interpretation clearly would require that a greater
degree of creative and technical control be retained by residents. It is
also unclear whether the work might be primarily made by each category
of employees or whether authors and workers collectively could fulfill the
requirement. Further, the Directive does not define the terms "author"
or "worker," both of which have many meanings. For example, the au-
thor could be the screenwriter, director, producer, cinematographer, or
one of any number of creative personnel. A worker could be anyone,
from a key editor to a food caterer on the set. Finally, the Directive does
not indicate how long a person must reside in a member country to be
considered a resident.
In addition to the residency requirement, at least one of three condi-
tions must also be met in order for a work to qualify as "European."
First, the production may qualify if it is "made by one or more producers
established in one or more of [the Member States]."45 The relationship
between the term "established" and residency is unclear. "Established"
could relate to a period of time, with perhaps an intent to remain, or the
size of the production's European operation. In either case, this is not
the condition under which U.S.-E.C. joint ventures are likely to qualify
their works as European. Rather, works produced by joint ventures will
usually qualify under either the second or third alternatives.
Second, the production could qualify if it "is supervised and actually
controlled by one or more producers established in one or more of [the
Member States]."46 If this section refers only to de facto control, the
U.S. partner could own fifty percent or more of the joint venture. The
venture could produce qualifying works as long as each production is
mainly made by resident authors and directors and is supervised and ac-
tually controlled by the E.C. partner. If "actual control" refers to dejure
control, then the European partner would have to own at least fifty-one
percent of the venture.
Third, the production would qualify if "the contribution of co-pro-
ducers of [the Member State or States] to the total co-production costs is
preponderant and the co-production is not controlled by one or more
producers established outside [the Member States]." 47 It is noteworthy
45. Id. at art. 6.2(a).
46. Id. at art. 6.2(b).
47. Id. at art. 6.2(c).
1991] STRUCTURING MEDIA JOINT VENTURES
HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J.
here that unlike a short term joint venture set up for the purposes of
producing one movie or series, a longer term joint venture would allow
greater flexibility because the partners could make trade-offs from one
production to the next, depending upon the condition under which the
individual works are qualified. Thus, the Directive's definitions are
broad enough to encompass a wide variety of co-produced works as "Eu-
ropean." However, it should be noted that under the French legislation,
it is almost impossible for U.S. media firms to satisfy the "European
works" requirement through ownership or control of E.C.-based produc-
tion companies. s
The Directive also provides for partially-qualified works. Under Ar-
ticle 6.4, if a work does not qualify as a "European work," but it is made
with authors and workers residing in one or more Member States, it will
be considered a European work "to an extent corresponding to the pro-
portion of the contribution of Community co-producers to the total pro-
duction costs."49 Thus, even where the U.S. partner supervises and
controls a co-production in the E.C. that is mainly made with resident
authors and workers, the work will qualify to the extent of the E.C. part-
ner's financial contribution. For example, if the E.C. partner contributes
twenty-five percent of the total costs, the work will be a twenty-five per-
cent European work, which is fifteen minutes of an hour-long program.
B. Partially Qualified vs. Completely Qualified Works
In anticipating the broadcast of co-produced works, U.S.-E.C. joint
ventures would be taking rather large risks if they produce any works not
fully qualified as European. There could be no absolute assurance that a
partially qualified work would be broadcast in the E.C., unless the joint
venture obtains agreement with the broadcaster prior to production.
48. Under this legislation, a work is of "European origin" if it meets five requirements:
(1) the works must be produced by a company whose head office is located in one of
the Member States and whose president and managing partner, together with a ma-
jority of the board members, are citizens of a Member state; and which company will
be in charge of, or share jointly in, the initiative and the financial, technical, and
artistic responsibility for the making of the program and is not controlled by produ-
cers established outside the E.C.;
(2) that the production is financed as to at least 50% of its final total cost by contri-
butions from E.C. citizens or companies with their head offices in the E.C.;
(3) that at least two-thirds of the total final costs of the production is composed of
costs incurred in the E.C.;
(4) that the work is made with actors, technicians, authors, producers, scriptwriters,
and musicians, two-thirds of whom are E.C. residents; and
(5) that the works include technical services, two-thirds of which are performed in
film or sound studios or laboratories located in the E.C.
Decree No. 90-66, supra note 39.
49. Directive, supra note 2, at art. 6.4.
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Even so, the broadcaster would have to know the composition and de-
tails of each production in order to assess the extent to which the work
would qualify as a European work.50 The broadcaster who has not yet
met the quota in his Member State will be more interested in pursuing
completely qualified works.51
Thus far, it appears that the amount of U.S. programming imported
into the E.C. has not approached the majority proportion level. 52 More-
over, as a result of the FCC's revised FISR, networks will be permitted to
acquire financial interests in U.S. productions not produced by the net-
work and syndicate these programs in international markets, provided
such rights are obtained in a secondary negotiation at least thirty days
after the network and producer reach a license fee agreement. 53 Net-
works will also be free to distribute internationally all of their own do-
mestically produced works free of any U.S. government distribution
restrictions.54 Thus, U.S. firms may be in a position to continue to offer
U.S. domestically produced programs to Europe, and at significantly
lower costs.5 5  However, these works will not qualify as "European
works" at all unless an E.C. producer has contributed to the production.
Thus, with respect to these works, U.S. producers will simply have to
export to those Member States with less restrictive regulations, such as
the U.K., Denmark, or Germany, or to broadcasters that have otherwise
met or closely approached their "European work" requirements.
50. That each program must be assessed separately in determining the extent to which the
broadcaster meets the majority proportion requirement can be inferred from Article 4.3 of the
Directive, which requires the Member States to provide the E.C. Commission with a report
every two years, including a statistical statement on the achievement of the proportion for each
of the television programs falling within its jurisdiction and the reasons for the failure to attain
that proportion. Directive, supra note 2, at art. 4.3.
51. What may not be entirely clear from the Directive is the extent to which an individual
broadcaster may fall below the majority proportion requirement where the majority propor-
tion requirement is being met collectively by other broadcasters in that Member States's juris-
diction. If the requirement can be met collectively, it would be easier for the joint venture to
find broadcast outlets for its partially qualified productions.
52. Presburger & Tyler, supra note 6, at 503.
53. Report and Order, supra note 3, at para. 179.
54. Id. at para. 125.
55. One factor that has made U.S. television and film products so competitive in Europe
in the past is that European broadcasters can purchase programs for much less than their
original cost in the U.S. and less than the cost of creating new shows. This difference in cost in
television programs is due to the fact that these shows are financed primarily by U.S. television
networks. So, for example, broadcasters pay about $36,000 to $54,000 per hour for shows
such as "The Cosby Show" and "Golden Girls" that cost about $636,000 to $720,000 per hour
to produce. Europe has also been particularly interested in made-for TV products. Cohen
Comments, supra note 4, at 14.
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To the extent that a particular Member State's laws allow a joint
venture between a U.S. media company and an E.C. broadcaster,56 the
risk of producing partially qualified works would be less because the joint
venture itself would be able to monitor the programming decisions of the
station. However, pursuant to Article 5, Member States must ensure
that broadcasters in their jurisdiction "reserve at least 10% of their
transmission time, excluding the time appointed for. news, sports events,
games, advertising and teletext services, or alternatively, at the discretion
of the Member State, at least 10% of their programming budget, for Eu-
ropean works created by producers who are independent of broadcast-
ers."57 This additional requirement makes such arrangements between
producers and broadcasters less attractive, assuming the Member State
would permit such an arrangement at all.58
There is also a provision in the Directive that precludes broadcasters
from broadcasting any cinematographic work it co-produces with an in-
dependent producer, unless otherwise agreed between its rights holders
and the broadcaster, until one year has elapsed since the work was first
shown in cinemas.59 Given the uncertainty of future Member State legis-
56. As the Member States begin to privatize broadcasting, some of the states may in the
future, if they do not already, preclude foreign entities from holding controlling interests in
broadcast licenses, as is the case in the U.S. under section 310 of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended. 47 U.S.C. § 310. Presently, the Netherlands does not restrict broadcast
ownership to European citizens, but does have a residency requirement. See 164 Mediawet
arts. 31-82 (1988). However, in Denmark, a commercial enterprise is not permitted to have a
controlling interest in a local radio and television broadcasting license and a majority of the
members of the Commission granting the license must be local residents. Act No. 421 § 15a(2)
(Den.) (enacted June 15, 1973, regarding radio and television broadcasting) In France, foreign
nationals, other than nationals of EC Member States, cannot hold, directly or indirectly, more
than 20% of the registered capital or voting rights of a company which holds a license. Law
No. 90-1170 of Dec. 29, 1990 § 1 art. L. 33-1, II, J.O. Dec. 30, 1990 at 16439 (Defining the
New Regulatory Framework of the French Telecommunications Industry) (Fr.) In Italy,
licenses cannot be held by non-E.C. citizens. Law No. 223 of Aug. 6, 1990, art. 16, § § 8(a)-
(c), 9, Gazzetta Ufficiale della Republica Italiana (Gazz. Uff.] Aug. 9, 1990 ("Disciplina del
sistema radiotelevision publico e privato.") (Italy). In Switzerland, private entities can hold
broadcast licenses only on the local level and only if they are a natural citizen of Switzerland, a
corporation controlled by Swiss citizens, or domiciled in the area served. Law No. 24 of June
7, 1982, 1149, art. 7, Recueil des lois Federales, June 29, 1982 (Switz.). In Spain, non-E.C.
ownership is limited to a 25% interest in the licensee. Law No. 10 of May 3, 1988, 956, art.
18, Repertorio Agranzadi Cronologico de Legislacion [R.A.L.] May 5, 1988 (Spain). In the
United Kingdom, non-E.C. residents cannot control broadcast stations. Broadcasting Act,
1984, § 8 (Eng.). Assuming no de facto control by the U.S. company, most countries would
presumably allow the U.S. partner to hold a minority stock interest or limited partnership
interest, except as noted above.
57. Directive, supra note 2, at art. 5.
58. The Directive does indicate, apart from the text of Article 5, that in determining the
definition of independent producer, the Member States could consider a co-production subsidi-
ary of a television organization as independent from the broadcaster. Id. at 25.
59. Id. at art. 7.
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lation, it would be risky to co-produce a movie, not knowing whether it
would qualify for broadcast a year later.
Based on the foregoing, the risks of producing only partially quali-
fied works outweigh the benefits. If the joint venture produces partially
qualified works despite the risks, it should do so through a long-term,
multiple production venture rather than a single production venture, so
that the partners can better monitor whether their collective productions
are complying with the quotas in various Member States.
C. Structuring the Venture to Both Partners' Advantage
A joint venture may not necessarily comply with the majority pro-
portion rule simply by giving the E.C. partner a fifty-one percent interest
and the U.S. partner a forty-nine percent interest, nor is this arrangement
necessary. In some productions of the venture, the E.C. partner may
finance a greater share of the production costs and control the produc-
tion. -In other productions, the U.S. partner may contribute more of the
costs, yet relinquish supervisory and actual control of the production.
Further, each production of the joint venture will have to qualify sepa-
rately as a "European work" under Article 5.2, even if the majority of
works made by the venture were "European works," that would not au-
tomatically qualify the others as such simply because the venture was set
up in a forty-nine/fifty-one ratio.
It is entirely possible that each partner could maintain a fifty percent
equity interest in, make a fifty percent contribution to, and retain fifty
percent of the profits from the joint venture.' However, because of the
E.C. Directive, and similar or stricter Member State requirements that
will be adopted pursuant to it, such contributions to the venture must be
made in stages. There are basically three stages involved in any one co-
production, whether the joint venture produces one or several programs:
the development stage, the production stage, and the distribution (or ex-
ploitation) stage. In each of these stages, the U.S. partner will be able to
exercise some degree of control, although it is in the distribution stage
that the U.S. partner's functions are the least restricted. The joint ven-
ture agreement should reflect the extent of each partner's contribution at
each stage. Generally, the U.S. partner will contribute cash, technical
know how, knowledge of and access to the U.S. market, sophisticated
world-wide distribution networks, and packaging and advertising skills.
60. In terms of the legal form of the venture, a few factors should be considered. If the
joint venture is to be long term, a corporate form probably makes more sense because the
financial contributions, tax consequences, and other potential liabilities will be greater other-
wise. Some of these considerations exist with short-term productions, but to a lesser extent,
thus making the partnership form of business a viable alternative.
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The E.C. partner will contribute cash, more creative control, knowledge
of and access to the European market, and other world markets with
similar cultures, and the ability to adapt the work to other European
languages and cultures.
1. Creative Control
The U.S. partner will have less creative control over a given co-pro-
duction of the venture than the E.C. partner because the Directive re-
quires that European works be mainly made by European authors and
workers.61 Creative control is generally exercised in both the develop-
ment and production stages. At the development stage, if the script has
not already been written, a scriptwriter must be hired, paid, and given
instructions regarding rewrites. At some point in the development stage,
a costs/benefits analysis will determine whether the particular "prop-
erty" is likely to be successful. Unlike the sale of other types of goods
and services, creative works are not fungible. Each individual work must
stand or fall on its own. Therefore, the decision to proceed with produc-
tion is very important.
It does not appear that the Directive would bar equal participation
in the decision to proceed with a particular script. The Directive may
also allow equal participation in the selection of a scriptwriter if the cho-
sen writer is European. Questions regarding rewrites and supervision
may have to be relinquished to the E.C. producer. If there is to be no
European production, the parties should determine who will own the un-
derlying property and how the final product will be distributed. If there
is a disagreement as to whether to proceed with production, an opt-out
provision would determine how the parties will be reimbursed for ex-
penses and/or a share if the production is later produced by the other
party.
The Directive makes clear that during production, creative control
must reside mainly with the European resident participants. 62 However,
it is vitally important to the joint venture's success that the U.S. partner
be consulted on creative decisions. This is because the final product will
also be destined for distribution in the U.S., a market which the U.S.
partner knows better. It should be made clear, however, that the U.S.
partner does not have veto power in such decisions.
It should be noted that the relinquishment of creative control does
not necessitate the relinquishment of the copyrights in the co-produced
works, which should at the very least be held jointly. 63 Ownership of the
61. Directive, supra note 2, at art. 6.
62. See id.
63. See infra Part III (c)
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copyrights is especially important to future exploitation of the underlying
works. Such future rights can include the right to remakes, sequels, spi-
noffs, and exploitation of the characters.
The significant loss of creative control may actually be in the best
interest of the U.S. partner. The E.C. partner will be able to bring fresh
ideas and formats to the production that are more palatable to European
audiences. Moreover, due to the various languages and cultures of the
E.C., E.C. producers will be in a better position to insure that the co-
produced programs are appealing to a much broader cross-section of the
world's entertainment markets. For example, the programs might be
more likely appeal to audiences in Latin America and Africa, where
French or Spanish are predominant languages.
2. Supervisory and Actual Control
In productions under Article 6.2(b) of the Directive, the U.S. part-
ner will have to relinquish supervisory control of the co-production. In
productions under Article 6.2(b) and (c), the U.S. partner will have to
relinquish actual control as well. Such arrangements would not be atypi-
cal of other international joint ventures, where the foreign partner, being
less familiar with operating a business in the home country, relinquishes
substantial control over production to the partner in the home country.
In order to create programs, European producers will seek U.S.
technical knowledge. Technology transfer is one of the stated goals of
the E.C. Commission's MEDIA Programme." While the Directive's
provisions allow some latitude in providing technical assistance, U.S.
partners should initially avoid enabling their E.C. partners to obtain the
technical skills they need to compete with U.S. companies in the future.
Assuming that the "mainly made" requirement is numerical, as ap-
pears to be the case from the French legislation, the U.S. partner should
use its key technical "workers" in the production up to the applicable
numerical limit. In this way, the U.S. partner can ensure its future indis-
pensability to the E.C. partner
There are numerous other decisions that must be made in the pro-
duction stage, some of which the U.S. partner can participate in equally
without jeopardizing the production's "European work" status. The
E.C. partner will most likely contribute the facilities, although the U.S.
partner could do this as well. If one party elects to contribute a fixed
amount, currency fluctuations should be considered. The parties could
jointly control decisions relating to accounting, budgeting, insurance,
union agreements and work permits, and screen credit.
64. Audiovisual Policy Communication, supra note 24, at 12-14.
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3. Costs of Production
In a production qualifying under Article 6.2(c) of the Directive, the
U.S. partner will contribute less to the costs of production. However,
this too can be advantageous for the joint venture. Through the MEDIA
programme, new sources of funds, including government subsidies, will
be available to the E.C. partners. In addition, European co-operatives
may provide funds for production. These sources of additional funding
reduce the amount of funding required from the U.S. partner. 6, There
will also be more pressure for European governments to invest more
money into the film and broadcasting industries, which in turn will bene-
fit U.S. companies engaged in joint ventures.
This does not mean that E.C. partners will not continue to benefit
from the financial contribution that U.S. partners would be permitted to
contribute. The E.C. Directive's quotas have created pressures for Euro-
pean broadcasters to reduce the costs of qualifying European co-produc-
tions. In the future, much of the inexpensive U.S. programs, which have
previously been shown on European television will not qualify as foreign
works and E.C. companies will be forced to find inexpensive shows that
will qualify as European works.66 This will make U.S. co-financing at-
tractive. As the number of independent producers grows in Europe,
broadcasters will be able to save money and purchase better products
from a larger number of independents. 67 This could result in "pig-
gybacking" of smaller independents with larger studios and broadcasters,
such as Zenith with Paramount6 and Telemunchen with ABC. 69 Co-
productions would likely increase as studios cut production costs. 70
4. Distribution Control
a. Opportunities for U.S. Firms
Distribution is the most important factor from the U.S. producer's
viewpoint. The Directive does not appear to limit the U.S. partner's con-
trol over distribution.71 If it did, the E.C.'s argument in the GATT
65. Cohen Comments, supra note 4, at 41.
66. Id. at 14.
67. Id. at 41.
68. MIP Market Abounds With Co-production Deals, BROADCASTING, Apr. 30, 1990, at
38.
69. Madelon DeVoe Talley, Investors Confront a New Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,
1989, § 6, pt. 2, at 21.
70. Id.
71. The only indication that the Directive was intended to apply to distribution is in the
heading of Chapter III, which is entitled "Promotion of Distribution and Production of Televi-
sion Programmes." Otherwise, it would appear from the text that the Directive applies only to
production. Directive, supra note 2, at Ch. III.
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would be weaker because the E.C. would not be able to maintain that its
quotas are related merely to preservation of the European culture. While
the E.C. wants to establish sophisticated distribution systems of their
own,72 currently sixty percent of cinema film distribution in the E.C. is
controlled by Americans.73 This presents an opportunity for U.S. part-
ners to contribute a valuable component to the joint venture, and ensure
their place in the E.C. for a long time to come. U.S. studios, independent
producers, and networks all have superior abilities to distribute the co-
produced products in the E.C. and worldwide. In particular, the U.S.
networks possess several attributes that make co-productions or joint
ventures particularly advantageous to E.C. firms. They have established
relationships with broadcasters and have acquired substantial program-
ming and packaging skills.74
The U.S. partner can also provide the E.C. partner with improved
access to the U.S. market. For example, co-produced programs could be
made available on U.S. networks during the summer months, giving U.S.
viewers more original programming. 75 It is clear from the E.C. Commis-
sion's Audiovisual Policy Communication that access to foreign markets
is an important objective to the E.C. partner. 76  The MEDIA Pro-
gramme attempts to remedy several problems faced by the E.C.: (1) high
production costs due to the limited national scope of the target markets;
(2) the lack of a secondary market for E.C. films and broadcasting prod-
ucts; and (3) the risky nature of productions directed towards specific
national audiences and the even riskier nature of 'cross frontier'
products.77
b. The Effect of FISR on U.S. Distribution Control
To the extent that E.C. partners will co-produce programming with
U.S. networks, it is important to look at the FCC's new FISR,78 which
outlines, among other things, the extent to which U.S. networks79 may
72. One of the objectives of the MEDIA Programme is to enable Europeans to establish a
more adequate trans-European distribution system, rather than relying on present systems
controlled by the U.S. Laurence H. Gross, E. C May Invest $300 Mil in Booster Program for
Prod'n, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Apr. 11, 1990, at 1-8.
73. Audiovisual Strategy: European Commission Proposes a Comprehensive Action Pro-
gramme Worth ECU 250 Million for 1991-1995 European Commission, U.S. Office, Brussels,
Apr., 1990.
74. Cohen Comments, supra note 4, at 17-19.
75. Id. at 19-20.
76. Audiovisual Policy Communication, supra note 24.
77. Cohen Comments, supra note 4, at 33.
78. Report and Order, supra note 3, at app. B, to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j)
(1991).
79. The new rules are to define a network as offering more than 15 hours per week of
prime time programming on a regular basis to interconnected affiliates that reach, in aggregate,
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take advantage of those vitally important distribution systems. In this
regard, the FISR permits networks to syndicate co-produced works in-
ternationally and to allow the programs greater accessibility to broadcast
on U.S. networks as well as off-network broadcast.
Heretofore, the FISR, adopted in 1970, prohibited broadcast televi-
sion networks from, among other things, actively syndicating, or having
any interest in the syndication of programs for non-network broadcast
distribution. 0 A limited exception entitled the networks to syndicate
outside of the U.S. programs the networks solely produced. Under the
previous rules, a co-production with an E.C. firm would not be consid-
ered "solely produced" by the network."' Thus, although networks
could engage in joint ventures to produce programs, they could not share
in the profits from the domestic or foreign syndication of those programs.
This made joint ventures less attractive to U.S. networks.8 2 Moreover,
because the previous FISR precluded the networks' use of their U.S. dis-
tribution system for co-produced programs, it is also argued that U.S.
networks were also less attractive to European partners.8 3
Pursuant to the Further Notice,8 4 the FCC considered whether to
repeal all or part of the FISR. In the FISR proceeding, it was argued
that the prohibition against foreign syndication of co-produced works
placed the networks in a particularly precarious position vis-a-vis the Eu-
ropean Directive and kept them from taking advantage of the growing
E.C. market for audiovisual works.8 5 It was further noted by some that
the previous FISR prevented U.S. companies from taking advantage of
efficiencies available to foreign-owned companies, citing the many recent
take-overs of U.S. studios by foreign companies, who are not restricted
from foreign syndication by FISR.8 6 Additionally, the networks asserted
that if they could buy foreign syndication rights, independent producers
would not be forced to choose between large Hollywood studios, major
independents and smaller firms, all of which lacked the personnel and
resources to distribute abroad efficiently. 8 7
at least 75% of television households nationwide. Report and Order, supra note 3, at para.
145. A new network's program ownership rights obtained prior to becoming a "network" are
to be "grandfathered." Id. at para. 159.
80. Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules, Report and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d
382, at 402 (1970).
81. Cohen Comments, supra note 4, at 6.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Further Notice, supra note 3.
85. Cohen Comments, supra note 4, at 17-20.
86. See e.g., Brock Comments, supra note 11, at ii.
87. Id. at 5-6.
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c. In-House Production Under the New FISR
One of the most important aspects of the FCC's recent decision for
purposes of joint ventures involving networks and E.C. partners is that
the term "in-house production" has been redefined. In-house produc-
tions now include not only programs "solely produced" by the network
(i.e., the network possesses full financial responsibility, full business con-
trol, and one hundred percent ownership of the copyright,) but also co-
productions between the network and a foreign producer.8 While a net-
work may undertake "in-house" program production without limit, there
are some limits on the distribution of those programs.
First, the network may not fill more than forty percent of its prime
time8 9 entertainment program schedule with in-house productions.90
Subject to the forty percent schedule cap, a network may retain a finan-
cial interest in and syndicate domestically prime time entertainment pro-
grams produced in-house and aired on its network.91 However, its rights
to domestic syndication of the in-house production is subject to anti-
warehousing and anti-favoritism safeguards. 92 Specifically, under the
anti-warehousing provision, a network has to make all prime time en-
tertainment programs in which it holds financial interests or syndication
rights available for airing in syndication within four years of a program's
network exhibition or six months after the end of its network run, which-
ever is sooner.93 This provision should benefit E.C. partners who are co-
producing with U.S. networks because it will ensure that co-produced
programs will have access to all U.S. broadcast markets. Second, the
anti-favoritism provision provides that a network cannot favor its affili-
ates. 94 Such favoritism will be rebuttably presumed if in-house produc-
tions are syndicated to network owned or affiliated stations in more than
thirty percent of the markets where the program is sold.95 The affiliate
favoritism provision may prevent networks from realizing the full extent
of their domestic distribution system. This in turn could prevent the
E.C. partner from realizing the full benefits of co-producing with a net-
work. While some of these provisions may make co-production with a
network less appealing to an E.C. partner, those considerations will prob-
88. Report and Order, supra note 3, at para. 56.
89. Prime time refers to the period during the hours of 7 p.m. to I I p.m. eastern time and
pacific time, or 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. central time and mountain time. Id. atpara. 21.
90. Id. at paras. 54, 69.
91. Id. at paras. 54, 108.
92. Id. at paras. 110, 111.
93. Id. at para. 1 11.
94. Id. at para. 10.
95. Id.
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ably not outweigh the potential benefits of having the co-produced pro-
grams aired by the U.S. network and syndicated in the U.S.
An added benefit for a network that is a U.S. joint venture partner is
that as a result of the FCC's recent decision, the network will be able to
syndicate internationally all its in-house productions, including programs
produced in-house and aired on another network. 96 Non-network produ-
cers have previously enjoyed this benefit.97
In sum, the fact that the U.S. partner may lose some control over
the actual production of the programs does not preclude the U.S. part-
ner's control over distribution. Nor should the U.S. partner refrain from
seeking an equal, if not greater proportion, of the financial gains from
distribution of the co-produced products in the European and other
worldwide markets.
The joint venture agreement should indicate which party will own
the distribution rights in which territories. In this regard, the U.S. part-
ner should not be concerned that other works it has produced outside the
joint venture will compete with the joint venture's works. Unlike other
types of products, programming is not usually strongly identified with a
particular company. Rather, consumers usually watch programs they
like no matter who produces them. Further, the U.S. partner will proba-
bly want to exact fees for its distribution efforts and expenses, unless
these are considered part of its contribution to the venture, in which case
these services should be valuated. The joint venture agreement should
contemplate the limits of the distribution expenditures that can be made
and the partners should determine how production costs will be
recouped; what rights will be "bought out" through budgetary contribu-
tions; which party will pay residuals to performers, or more commonly in
the E.C., to performing rights societies (like ASCAP or BMI in the U.S.);
how independent contractors will be paid; which party will control the
exploitation of ancillary rights; and where will the "world premiere" be
held.
5. Dispute Resolution and Termination
Because of the E.C. Directive's restrictions on foreign control, the
most effective type of dispute resolution mechanism that can be included
in this type of joint venture agreement is a list of the type of decisions
that will be decided by the E.C. partner, those that will be decided by the
96. Id. at para. 125.
97. The FCC has determined that it will review the modified rules four years after their
effective date, which is 30 days after publication of the Report and Order in the Federal Regis-
ter. If market conditions at the time of that review are sufficient to justify complete repeal of
the rules, the Commission may do so at that time. Id. at para. 179.
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U.S. partner, and those that will be decided jointly.- With respect to
those decisions that can be decided jointly, typical dispute settlement
provisions can be relied upon, such as a swing vote director, arbitration,
or a combination of methods. Typical provisions, whereby one partner
buys out the other's shares in the event of deadlock, may not be viable at
the production stage because of the Directive's mandate that the E.C.
partner control the production.
With respect to termination, it is very important that the joint ven-
ture agreement address the possibility that the laws will change, espe-
cially where the agreement is entered in a Member State that has not yet
implemented the Directive. This may be accomplished with a force
majeure clause. In addition, given the fact that each partner's participa-
tion will be greater at different stages, the agreement should address the
consequences of a partner's termination at any of the three stages of the
operation. During production, the U.S. partner is more vulnerable be-
cause it depends on the E.C. partner to fulfill its production functions.
Of course, one way to limit the U.S. partner's exposure at this stage is to
permit it to increase its financial contribution progressively. Similarly,
the E.C. partner is more vulnerable at the distribution stage when it is
relying on the U.S. partner to make its best efforts to exploit the work.
By this time, the E.C. partner has made most or all of its contribution.
Thus, termination windows could be fixed upon conclusion of certain
stages, with compensation assessed in accordance with the contribution a
party has made up to that stage.
Alternatively, the agreement could provide that termination be al-
lowed only upon unanimous agreement, thus allowing the parties to eval-
uate the specific circumstances at any given point in the production.
This would be particularly feasible in media productions, because the cir-
cumstances of each is completely different from the next. In any event,
the joint venture agreement should enumerate all of the parties' rights
and obligations for termination at different stages of operation. It should
also provide for the return of confidential information, appropriate li-
censing and assignment of copyrights, releases, and the payment of out-
standing loans.
6. U.S.-E.C. Joint Venture Examples
NBC has opened a new European production studio to develop, pro-
duce, and distribute fiction programming for the European television
market and for worldwide sales; acquired a thirty-eight percent interest
in Visnews, a worldwide news-gathering organization; established a co-
venture with Pasco McNally International in the United Kingdom,
which is a joint script development fund with ITV commercial station,
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Yorkshire TV Ltd. (Tango Productions); and acquired an option to buy
thirty-five percent of Joop Van den Ende Productions, a top-rated in-
dependent producer in the Netherlands.9" ABC has an agreement to co-
produce and co-finance television programs with ZDF, a leading off-air
German Network; owns twenty-five percent of Hamster Production Co.
in France; owns an equity stake in Telemunchen in Germany through
ABC Video Enterprise and plans a similar investment in Tesauro Pro-
ductions in Spain; owns a twenty-five percent interest in Screen Sport, a
satellite-delivered sports service available throughout Western Europe
through ESPN/ABC, a subsidiary of ABC.99 CBS has a $1.5 million co-
production deal with a consortium of companies from Germany, the
United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Spain, broadcasters from Austria
and Switzerland, and a co-production pact with BBC in the U.K."°
The U.S. motion picture industry, not previously bound by any FCC
restrictions, has also begun co-producing in the E.C. Paramount has ac-
quired a forty-nine percent stake in Zenith Group, a London-based tele-
vision producer.101 MCA International has negotiated two new co-
production agreements for television series that will be distributed in the
U.S. in prime time. One of the partners is based in the United Kingdom
and MCA TV has agreed to sell the show in domestic syndication as a
prime time series. The other series is being produced with a German
partner. Half of the production will be done in Germany and half in
North America. It will be aired in the U.S. on a cable network. MCA
will also produce a made-for-television movie with a U.K. partner. 2
III
Copyright Considerations
Usually, the product of a joint venture will be reproduced and per-
formed (exhibited) in several ways, both in the country in which it is
produced and in other countries. For example, a made-for-television
movie may first be exhibited on television, either on a network or in-
dependent station. A movie initially exhibited in a movie theater may
also be exhibited on television. If broadcast on a network, a program
may then be syndicated on other broadcast stations and on cable or via
satellite. Movies will also usually be sold and rented on videocassette.
98. Testimony of Jack Valenti, President and CEO of the Motion Picture Association of
America, Inc. and Member of thie Coalition to Preserve the FISR, FISR En Banc Hearing in
MM Dkt No. 90-162, at 6-7 Before the Federal Communications Commission (Dec. 14, 1990).
99. Id. at 7.
100. Id. at 7-8.
101. MIP Market Abounds With Co-production Deals, BROADCASTING, Apr. 30, 1990, at
38.
102. Id. at 38.
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They may also be exhibited in some or all of the E.C. countries (currently
with different copyright laws), the United States, and other international
markets as well.
Having determined where and how the joint venture product will be
produced, the issue of distribution becomes paramount. If the U.S. part-
ner ends up with more of the distribution control, as proposed above, it
will be vital that the U.S. partner understand the copyright implications
of distributing the product in the E.C. Unlike the U.S., most civil law,
E.C. member countries do not recognize the work-for-hire doctrine and
limit the rights of commissioning parties to those specified in the contract
of hire. All other rights belong to the author or authors. Thus an issue
arises as to who is the author. This is a complicated copyright question
and the answer may vary among the Member States. Unlike more typi-
cal joint ventures, neither party may be contributing intellectual property
to the joint venture initially, unless the final product will be based on an
underlying work owned by one of the partners. If one of the partners
owns the underlying work, such as the book for a screenplay, provision
should be made in the joint venture agreement regarding its continued
ownership. One partner may wish to "buy out" the other partners' ancil-
lary rights, such as remake and sequel rights, at the outset. Further, the
joint venture may have to enter into separate waiver of royalties agree-
ments with others who potentially hold a stake in the copyrights, such as
the director and screenwriter. 103 In any event, such ancillary agreements
should be appropriately referenced in the joint venture agreement.
Assuming that the underlying work and the final work product are
to be jointly owned by the co-producers, there remain two questions that
should be addressed in determining how the program or programs
should be reproduced and performed: (1) what level of protection may
be expected in the E.C. and (2) what are the limits of that protection.
Once these issues are addressed, there are other copyright-related consid-
erations that may impinge on distribution decisions, such as the issues of
"moral rights" and copyright in broadcast and cable distribution.
A. Scope of Protection
The United States and all of the E.C. countries are members of the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
(Berne Convention). °4 While negotiations are currently underway in
103. There is some question in the E.C. now as to whether certain rights, such as "moral
rights" can be waived at all. Working Programme of the Commission in the Field of Copyright
and Neighbouring Rights, COM(90)584 Final at 34 [hereinafter Follow-up Paper].
104. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works [Berne Conven-
tion], Sept. 9, 1886, completed at Paris, 1896, revised at Berlin, Nov. 13, 1908, completed at
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several forums to strengthen international copyright protection, °5 the
Berne Convention remains the primary vehicle for such protection. The
aim of the Berne Convention is to establish a minimum level of copyright
protection that must be adopted into the national legislation of all of the
member countries.° 6
The Berne Convention also provides that the enjoyment and exer-
cise of copyright in the Berne member countries shall not depend on any
special conditions or formalities, such as registration and copyright no-
tice.' 07 Thus, because all E.C. Member States are members of the Berne
Convention, it is not necessary that the products be registered in order to
be protected by copyright. However, because certain other advantages
may adhere upon registration, such as the right to attorney's fees in an
infringement action, the joint venture agreement should indicate which
partner is responsible for registering the copyrights to the underlying
works, the program itself, and any derivative works, such as the musical
score.
Berne, Mar. 20, 1914, revised at Rome, June 2, 1928, revised at Brussels, June 26, 1948, re-
vised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, reprinted in 1971 CoPy-
RIGHT 135 and in U.N. EDUC., ScI, & CULTURAL ORG. & WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
COPYRIGHT LAWS & TREATIES OF THE WORLD (Supp. 1972).
105. Currently, talks involving the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPs), are being conducted by one of the multilateral working groups in the pending Uru-
guay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations. The
TRIPs talks are being pursued in order to include a proposed intellectual property code within
the GATI'. In the Uruguay Round, the U.S. seeks a GATI model of rulemaking and dispute
settlement, which will then be applied in the intellectual property area. See R. MICHAEL
GADBAW & TIMOTHY J. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSEN-
SUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 40 (1988). These would include internationally recognized mini-
mum standards for the protection of copyright and enforcement procedures. The EC wants to
incorporate by reference the obligations of the Berne Convention and provide other rights,
such as rental rights for cinemagraphic works. The U.S. text, on the other hand, would re-
quire contracting parties to provide authors and their successors in title with the economic
rights provided in the Berne Convention, but would not include the "moral rights" provisions
of the Berne Convention. "Moral rights" include the author's independent right, even after
transfer of his economic rights, "to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distor-
tion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said
work, which would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation." Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supra note 104, at art. 6bi. There are also negotia-
tions underway within the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) on the interna-
tional harmonization of copyright laws as well as an initiative to prepare an interpretive
protocol to the Berne Convention.
106. M.M. BOGUSLAVSKY, COPYRIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: INTERNA-
TIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC WORKS 88 (1979)..
107. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supra note 104,
at art. 5(2). When the U.S. joined the Berne Convention in 1988, its implementation legisla-
tion eliminated all formalities. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 2853
(1988).
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The Berne Convention's illustrative list of protected works generally
fits into two groups. The first group enjoys full unconditional protection
defined in the Convention itself. This group includes: books, pamphlets,
dramatic and dramatico-musical works, choreographic and musical com-
positions with or without words, cinematographic works, paintings,
sculptures, and architectural works.108 The second group, for which pro-
tection is determined by the domestic legislation of member countries,
includes official texts of a legislative, administrative, or legal nature and
official translations of such texts and political speeches."°
Pursuant to the national treatment clause of Article 5, persons enti-
tled to Convention protection 1 ° have, with respect to their work in all
member countries, "the rights which their respective laws do now or may
hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted
by this Convention.""' Thus, if the Berne Convention does not specify
other rules, the laws of the country where protection is sought are ap-
plied." 2 The problem raised by the national treatment clause is that one
member country may not give as high a degree of protection to its own
nationals, and hence to the nationals of other member countries. Among
the E.C. member countries, copyright laws may vary greatly despite the
minimum level of protection afforded by the Berne Convention. Until
these laws are harmonized," 3 copyright holders in audiovisual works
108. BOGUSLAVSKY, supra note 106, at 93.
109. Id.
110. The persons entitled to corresponding rights under the Berne Convention include: (1)
authors who are nationals of member countries, who have published their work for the first
time in one of the member countries (according to the Paris text-in any country), and also
nationals of member countries who are authors of an unpublished work; (2) persons without
citizenship who reside in member countries; (3) authors who are nationals of countries not
party to the Convention, but having their usual residence in one of the member countries; and
(4) authors who are nationals of countries not party to the Convention, but whose work was
originally published in a member country of the Convention or was published simultaneously
in a member country and a non-member country. Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, supra note 104, at art. 3.
111. Id. at art. 5(1).
112. The country of origin is considered to be the Berne member country in which the
work is first published, or in the case of works first published simultaneously in several coun-
tries of the Union which grant different terms of protection, the country whose legislation
grants the shortest term of protection, or if the work is published simultaneously in a member
country and a non-member country, the Berne member country. Id. at art. 5(4)(a),(b). As
regards cinematographic work, the country of origin is considered to be a country of the Union
in which the maker resides or has his headquarters. Id. at art. 5(4)(c).
113. On May 12, 1990, the E.C. Commission released the follow-up to the Green Paper on
Copyright and the Challenge of Copyright, Com(88)172 Final, entitled Working Programme of
the Commission in the Field of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Follow-up Paper, supra
note 103. The Follow-up Paper defines a general policy program outlining the steps the Com-
mission will be taking in respect to: copyright and neighboring rights based on the earlier
Green Paper and reactions to it and covers the period up to December 31, 1992. An important
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will be subject to various levels of protection in different countries.
Moreover, while the U.S. provides a high level of copyright protection, it
is well-settled that United States copyright laws do not have extraterrito-
rial effect. I I4 Consequently, infringing actions that take place entirely
outside the United States are not actionable in United States federal
courts." 5 Thus, the partners to the joint venture have no choice but to
accept the minimum protection afforded by various E.C. countries." 6
Being aware of the copyright laws in the various E.C. countries,
however, is not the end of the inquiry. Certain rights that stem from the
initial copyright, such as the reproduction 1 7 and performance rights," I8
may be lost or limited depending on where the work is distributed first.
Thus, it is important to understand the various limitations that have been
placed on these rights.
B. Limitations on the Reproduction and Performance Rights
When the treaty establishing the E.E.C.I '9 was executed, each Mem-
ber State had firmly established intellectual property laws and no provi-
area of concern to the Community involved distribution, exhaustion, and rental rights. In this
regard, the Commission noted that a Directive for the harmonization of rental and lending
rights had been prepared. Id. at 15. This proposal would grant to authors, performing artists
and producers an exclusive right to authorize or prohibit the commercial rental of protected
copyright works, phonograms, and videograms and the right would last for a minimum term
of 50 years after the death of the author (20 years under the Rome Convention for neighboring
rights). Id. One aspect of copyright law which has been seen as a particular obstacle in the
Community, due to the legislative disparities among the Member States, is the provision for
the duration of protection. Id. The Directive would lay down fixed periods of protection for
each type of work and for each neighboring right covered, and transitional measures would be
proposed. Id. at 33.
114. Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 664 F. Supp. 1345, 1351 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (relying on Peter
Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin Continental Films, 783 F.2d 1440, 1442 (9th Cir. 1986)).
115. Id. Where some infringing acts take place in the United States, a plaintiff may recover
the extraterritorial profits derived from those infringing acts. Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin
Continental Films, 783 F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Robert Stigwood Group v.
O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848 (1976).
116. For a detailed comparative discussion of the copyright laws of the various E.C. coun-
tries, including a discussion of special problems related to the protection of cinematographic
works, see DR. ADOLF DIETZ, COPYRIGHT LAW IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1978).
117. The reproduction right gives the copyright holder the right to preclude the physical
copying of the work by any process which enables it to be communicated indirectly to the
public. R. Joliet & P. Delsaux, Copyright in the Case Law of the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities in Publication for l'Association litteraire et artistique internationale
(ALAI) and the British Literary and Artistic Copyright Association (BLACA) 21 (1986).
118. Under the performance right, the copyright holder may preclude the direct communi-
cation of the work to the public. A performance may be done by actors before the public or by
means of physical recordings of the work (the broadcasting of a record by radio or of a film by
television or the public showing of a film). Id.
119. PRAITtS INSTITUANT LES COMMUNAAUTifS EUROPfENES, FOUNDATIONAL TREA-
TIES OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 801 (1987).
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sion of the treaty discussed enacting Community legislation in this field.
Articles 30 and 34 prohibit Member States from creating national restric-
tions on the free movement of goods and Article 59 extends this bar to
restrictions on the movement of services. Article 36 permits restrictions
justified on grounds of industrial and commercial property, provided
they do not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade between the Member States. The Court of the Euro-
pean Justice has interpreted Articles 30, 34, 36, and 59 in several copy-
right cases, thus deciding whether certain features of a national
legislation were contrary to those provisions. 120 Moreover, the European
Community has also attempted to pass legislation that is relevant to
copyright protection in the E.C.
One of the most important aspects of Community law is the princi-
ple of Community exhaustion, which prevents the territoriality of the
national legislation from becoming the source of multiple benefits for the
holder of parallel intellectual property rights in several Member States.
For example, if a copyright holder markets or consents to the marketing
of the product in a part of the Community with less copyright protection,
the copyright holder gives up the possibility of relying on the copyright
for that unit of product in another part of the Community where copy-
right protection is available. Community exhaustion has replaced na-
tional exhaustion. National exhaustion, in the case of exclusivity from a
copyright, would extend only to the first marketing of the copyrighted
product in the national territory.
The first aspect of Community exhaustion involves the inter-state
trade of recordings or copies (for example, videocassettes) made in the
exercise of the right of reproduction. Musik- Vertrieb Membran, Gmbh v.
GEMA, 121 hinged upon parallel imports of sound recordings manufac-
tured and initially marketed in the U.K. and then in Germany. In the
U.K. the copyright legislation provides that after a musical work has
been reproduced on a recording in the U.K. for the purpose of retail sale
by the author, anyone else can reproduce the work subject to the pay-
ment of a royalty to the copyright owner of 6.25% of the retail sale price
of the recording. In most European countries, including Germany, the
rate of those royalties is 8%. GEMA, the German copyright manage-
ment society, claimed that imports of recordings from the U.K. into Ger-
many entitled it to payment of the difference between the U.K. and the
German royalties. The Court held that national legislation authorizing
such a claim would be contrary to the rules on free movement of goods,
because the products had been marketed in the first Member State with
120. See infra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
121. Joined Cases 55 and 57/80, Musik-Vertrieb Membran v. Gema, 1981 E.C.R. 147.
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the copyright holder's consent.122 The Court noted that the author is
free to choose the place to first distribute his work and may make that
choice in his best interests, including the level of remuneration provided
in a particular Member State. 123 As a result, the determination of where
to first distribute the product of the joint venture may be extremely
important.
Another limitation of Community law affects the copyright holder's
right of performance. This limitation emerged in S.A. Compaginie
Generale Pour La Diffusion De La Television v. S.A. Cine 124 in the con-
text of public performance of films protected by copyright. The French
owner of the proprietary rights in the film "Le Boucher" had given Cine
Vog, a Belgian distribution company, the exclusive right to distribute the
film in Belgium for seven years. When Germany broadcast a German
version of the film with the authorization of the copyright owner, the film
was relayed into parts of Belgium by Coditel, a Belgian cable television
diffusion company. Cine Vog brought an action against Coditel. Under
Belgian copyright law, Coditel needed the authorization of Cine Vog to
relay the film over its network.
In Coditel 1, the issue was whether under Article 59 the assignee of
the performing right in a cinemagraphic film in one Member State could
rely upon this right to prevent a cable distributor from showing the film
in the member State by a third party in another Member State who has
the consent of the original owner of the right.
The Court determined that the consent given to the German televi-
sion company by the copyright holder did not exhaust the assignee's
copyright because copyright entails the right to demand fees for any per-
formance and the rules of the treaty cannot in principle constitute an
obstacle to the geographical limits which the parties to a contract of as-
signment have agreed upon in order to protect the author and the assigns
in this regard.'25
In Coditel 2, the Court of Cassation remanded to the Court of Ap-
peal to decide whether Article 85 (competition law) applied to a contract
granting exclusive performing rights for a certain period in a film in a
Member State. The Court determined that an exclusive license and an
assignment should be distinguished. An assignment raises no problems
under Article 85. Article 85 does not apply to an exclusive license cover-
122. Id. at 165.
123. Id.
124. Case 62/79, Coditel v. Cine Vog Films, 1980 E.C.R. 881 (first judgment, by the Brus-
sels Court of Appeals dealing with the issue of freedom to provide services) [hereinafter
Coditel I]; Case 262/8 1, Coditel v. Cine Vog Films, 1982 E.C.R. 3381 (second judgment, by
the Court of Cassation regarding the issue of competition law) [hereinafter Coditel 2].
125. Coditel 1, supra note 124, at 903.
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ing a Member State if it appears that without exclusive rights it would
not be possible to find a licensee for the territory in question.126
C. Other Copyright-Related Considerations
1. Moral Rights Protection
Because "moral rights" protection has been largely foreign to U.S.
copyright law, the U.S. partner should be aware of its effects on the prod-
uct of a joint venture. As noted by the E.C. Commission, "Article 6bis of
the Berne Convention on the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
lays down minimum rules on the scope and duration of moral rights,
while leaving it to legislation in the country where protection is claimed
to define the means of redress available to the author and other holders
after his death."'' 27
The Commission recognized that there are differences between the
Member states of the Community, as well as among the members of the
Berne Convention. 128  Cases asserting moral rights claims are increas-
ingly common in the E.C. The cases dealt with the treatment of
cinemagraphic works, including the colorization of black and white films
and commercial breaks in films broadcast on television. Thus, the invo-
cation of moral rights can generate restrictions on the use of works al-
ready made public. 129 The Commission has not yet proposed any general
harmonization of moral rights in the Member States, although it recog-
nizes that in certain areas, such as the duration of moral rights, harmo-
nizing legislation may have to be drafted.' 3 °
In the U.S.,' 3' some film makers have objected to the introduction of
moral rights because of the potential that personal preferences could in-
hibit efforts to make works available to the public.'3 2 These objectors
fear that "moral rights" could adversely affect business relations that
126. Coditel 2, supra note 124, at 3390.
127. Follow-up Paper, supra note 103, at 34.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 34-35.
131. The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-901, and other federal laws do not for-
mally incorporate subjective "moral rights." However, in joining the Berne Convention, it was
determined that several other federal laws and case law do protect "moral rights" to the extent
necessary to allow the U.S. to accede to the Berne Convention. However, Congress stressed
that "the 'moral rights' doctrine is not incorporated into U.S. law by the Berne Implementa-
tion Act." The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, S. Rep. No. 352, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. 9 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706, 3714.
132. In re Comprehensive Study of Globalization of Mass Media Firms, Comments of the
Committee for America's Copyright Community, to the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration, Notice of Inquiry in MM Dkt No. 900241-0041, at 7 (May 30,
1990) [hereinafter Comments of Committee].
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should be dictated by free negotiation, not by subjective, personal
preference. 133
Some of those opposed to the U.S. moral rights legislation, believe
that it would adversely affect the ability of U.S. copyright industries to
continue to make a broad, diverse array of works available to consumers
both in the U.S. and abroad. They note that the U.S. Copyright Act
presently gives the copyright owners the financial incentives to devote
resources and energy to producing and disseminating creative works, al-
lows copyright holders the flexibility to enter freely into business agree-
ments to make works available to the public, and provides copyright
holders with the certainty that their business activities will be governed
by the objective terms of such business agreements and not by subjective
judgments. 134
All of these considerations are very important in the E.C. where
most Member States do not recognize the producer as the sole author.
Many of the copyright-intensive industries are very collaborative; some-
times hundreds of individuals contribute to a particular project. 135 As a
financial matter, many of these industries must market their works to
ancillary markets, which often requires adapting their works to meet the
special demands of a market. 136 Any motion picture shot on film must
be adapted in order to be transferred to video. 37 Furthermore, various
media require compliance with various standards and practices that may
require editing.' 38
Some industries, such as broadcasting, newspapers, and magazine
publishing, are time-sensitive. As a result a contributor's objection to the
adaptation of his or her work would be especially problematic.139 In
many instances, such as in the motion picture business, an infusion of
large sums of money, with attendant high risks, is required."4 These
industries are also regulated by voluntary, arms-length, contractual
relationships.'
133. Id. at 7-8.
134. Id. at 12.
135. Id. at 13.
136. Id. at 13-14.
137. In re Comprehensive Study of Globalization of Mass Media Firms, Comments of the
Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., to the National Telecommunications and Infor-
mation Administration Notice of Inquiry in MM Dkt No. 900241-0041, at 24 n.132 (May 30
1990). For example, the film image has a different "aspect ratio" (much wider than it is tall)
than the TV image (which is more square). This requires adaptation of the image through
"panning and scanning." Id.
138. Id.
139. Comments of Committee, supra note 132, at 14.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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In light of the foregoing, the joint venture may wish to seek a waiver
of the various copyright holders' rights to the extent such waiver is al-
lowed by law. To the extent such a waiver is not permissible, the joint
venture agreement should indicate the extent to which each partner will
bear the consequences of the copyrights holders' objections to the use or
distribution of the product.
If moral rights legislation applicable to films is adopted in the U.S.,
its reach could extend to other countries. While, as noted above, U.S.
copyright law generally does not apply to infringing actions occurring
entirely outside the U.S., American courts have asserted jurisdiction
where any part of an action occurs within the U.S, such as the signing of
a contract.142 Once American courts assert jurisdiction, they often
award profits and damages calculated on the basis of worldwide
revenues. 143
Possibly the greatest concern to the U.S. producer is that moral
rights protection could allow every contributor to a project a right to sue
the copyright owner, claiming that a particular use or adaptation of the
work injures his or her reputation.'" This veto power could not only
affect the domestic distribution of co-produced works, but also foreign
distribution which may require subtitling, dubbing, or editing to meet
various foreign government restrictions. 145
2. Broadcast/Cable Copyright Protection
For works broadcast on television and via satellite retransmitted via
cable, there are further copyright considerations that are particular to
these media. "Broadcasters and networks hold copyrights in much of
their programming, including news and public affairs programming,
many sports broadcasts, and a significant number of entertainment pro-
grams and made-for-television movies. The unauthorized resale or re-
transmission of these works infringes on these copyrights and deprives
networks and broadcasters of potential income." 146 These works can be
142. See Peter Starr Production Co., 783 F.2d 1440, 1441-43 (9th Cir. 1986) (parties
signed contract in U.S. granting authorization to exhibit motion picture abroad).
143. See. e.g., Update Art. Inc. v. Modiin Publishing Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1988);
The Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1100-01 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 848 (1976).
144. Comments of Committee, supra note 132, at 18-19 (citing PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE, THE TRADEMARK ACT OF 1946 AND TECHNOLOGIES FOR ALTERATIONS OF MO-
TION PICTURES 44-46 (1989)).
145. Id. at 25. MPAA notes that "in those nations with strict moral rights regimes in force
(such as France), domestic motion picture industries are in decline." Id. at 26 n.42.
146. In re Comprehensive Study of Globalization of Mass Media Firms, Comments of
CBS, Inc., to the National Telecommunications and Information Administration Notice of
Inquiry in MM Dkt No. 900241, at 27 (May 30, 1990).
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pirated through unauthorized interception of satellite transmissions;
"networks routinely use satellite transmissions to feed programming to
affiliated stations and to purchasers of network-owned programming
around the world."' 47 "In addition to interception of satellite transmis-
sions, copyrighted programming is also being illegally pirated from over-
the-air transmissions."'148
The E.C. Commission has prepared a discussion paper on the
problems raised by copyright in the field of satellite broadcasting and
cable retransmission which will be addressed into a Directive. 49 The
measures envisaged for satellite broadcasting are based on three princi-
ples: (1) any satellite broadcast originating in a Community Member
State, must be regarded as an act of broadcasting for copyright purposes,
once such broadcasting constitutes communication to the public;' 5° (2)
the right to broadcast protected works by satellite need only be acquired
in the country of establishment of the broadcaster, taking into considera-
tion, if desired, the actual or potential audience within the footprint of
the satellite; and (3) an adequate level of protection for authors' rights
and of the neighboring rights of performers, producers of phonograms,
and broadcasters has to be secured by a minimum level of harmonization
of Member States' laws on the subject.' 5 '
The Commission's proposals regarding simultaneous, unaltered and
unabridged cable retransmission of broadcasts can be summed up in four
principles: (1) the cable retransmission of a program, coming from an-
other Member State, is a form of exploitation subject to copyright and
thus the cable operator must obtain authorization from the owners of all
rights in any part of the program; (2) these authorizations must be ob-
tained by contractual means; (3) such rights should be managed on an
exclusively collective basis, to the extent that this is made necessary by
the specific features of cable retransmission, and a measure should be
taken to ensure that smooth operation of collective agreements is not
halted by opposition of the owners of individual rights in sections of the
program to be retransmitted; and (4) negotiations between cable opera-
tors and right holders, represented by collecting societies, should be
147. Id. CBS News, for example, delivers twice-daily satellite feeds world-wide of news
programs tailored for foreign markets, and distributes the CBS Evening News daily by interna-
tional satellite. Broadcasters also receive satellite transmissions of foreign news and sports
events, which they then retransmit to their viewers. Id. at 27-28.
148. Id. at 28.
149. Follow-up Paper, supra note 103.
150. Id. at 37. "As far as copyright is concerned, therefore there is no longer any point in
making a distinction between direct broadcasting satellites and other satellites." Id.
151. Id. "In this regard, the possibility of a legal license for satellite must be ruled out.
Thus, the interests of right holders will be safeguarded no matter in which Member State the
broadcaster may be established." Id.
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eased by supplementary measures such as a voluntary conciliation mech-




Both the United States and the European Community have a large
stake in the dramatic growth of the European market for programming
due to the E.C.'s deregulation and privatization of its media industries.
To the extent that the U.S.' entrance into these markets appears
threatened by the E.C. Directive, which limits the amount of non-Euro-
pean stations, the U.S. can still make substantial inroads via co-
productions.
It is clear from the E.C.'s implementation of the MEDIA Pro-
gramme and otherwise that the E.C. will develop a competitive entertain-
ment industry with or without U.S. firms. Further, while the U.S. should
continue to challenge the Directive in the GATT, U.S. firms should not
risk losing momentum in the E.C. market by relying solely on a GATT
challenge. Rather, because the Directive leaves room for co-production
between Europeans and non-European producers, U.S. firms are in a
unique position to meet the needs of non-European producers, while
reaping substantial benefits for themselves.
Specifically, E.C. firms are particularly interested in U.S. technical
know-how, its knowledge of and access to the U.S. market, its sophisti-
cated worldwide distribution networks, and its packaging and advertising
skills. The E.C. firms, on the other hand, are in a position to contribute
cash, knowledge of the European market, and other world markets with
similar cultures, and the ability to adapt the work for other European
languages and markets throughout the world.
Giving up more creative control should simply not inhibit U.S. firms
from establishing joint ventures with the Europeans. In fact, the reces-
sion currently being experienced in the U.S. has made it more transpar-
ent that predicting the success of a particular film or program is not a
talent that lies exclusively within the domain of U.S. programmers. U.S.
and E.C. producers should expect that their co-productions will have a
synergistic, rather than inhibiting, effect. Through co-productions, both
partners should be able to increase their profits and knowledge many
times more than would be possible alone.
Because of the inherent risks involved and the potential volatility of
national legislation in the E.C., the partners should carefully craft the
152. Id. at 37-38.
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joint venture agreement to provide for unexpected circumstances. In ad-
dition, the partners should anticipate circumstances of termination and
dispute resolution. The partners must keep in mind too that the product
of such ventures is an artistic work, which must be protected through
copyright. This is somewhat problematic in U.S.-E.C. ventures because
different copyright laws adhere. Thus, it is important for the U.S. part-
ner to be aware of the copyright laws of the various Member States
where such ventures will be produced as well as other principles that
affect copyright protection in the E.C. Of particular note is the fact that
the E.C. protects the moral rights of authors much more broadly than
does the U.S. The potential effect is to give scores of people working on a
project rights that would not ordinarily be available in the U.S. Because
it is unclear whether such rights are waivable or not, producers must be
aware of these differences and contract accordingly.
In sum, given the recent restrictions on non-European programming
and the fact that resolving trade differences is a slow and politically ex-
plosive process, joint ventures remain one of few viable mechanisms for
U.S. firms to retain their share of world media markets.
[Vol. 14:1
